Declaration of the Public Movement “For the Revival of Orthodoxy”
The Moscow Patriarchate
The archives, in particular the correspondence of the first chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, KGB general G. Karpov, with Patriarch Alexy I, give a clear picture of how in 1943, on the site of the Church of martyrs and confessors, razed to the ground and laid waste by its persecutors, Stalin, Beria and Karpov built a religious organisation of an entirely new type, the Moscow Patriarchate, wholly controlled by the state’s punitive bodies.
Throughout its existence the Moscow Patriarchate unconditionally supported the foreign and domestic policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. There was not a single case of the Church raising its voice against the crimes of Soviet totalitarianism or in defence of persecuted believers.
More than that, it always came out in official support of the regime’s crimes, such as the military expansion in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and other shameful deeds. The brand of the “red church” has remained on the body of the Moscow Patriarchate.
All this could have been explained and forgiven had the Moscow Patriarchate proved sincere in its readiness to review and rethink its past in the time of unexpected freedom that came with the collapse of the communist regime in 1991. But it did not even try to begin its revival with repentance, which would have been natural from a Christian point of view. In all the years since the state abandoned its anti-religious policy, the Moscow Patriarchate has not found the strength to condemn its shameful collaboration with the God-fighting regime and its betrayal of its own faithful.
More important still, even in conditions of relative freedom the Russian Orthodox Church has proved incapable of serving the spiritual enlightenment of the Russian people, having fallen into pagan ritualism, “shamanism”, turning the Church into a combine for ritual and domestic services and the clergy into a priestly caste.
The Statute on the governance of the Russian Orthodox Church now in force, its civil Statute and the model Statute of parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church rigidly regulate a hierarchical dictatorship, establishing the absolute power of the Synod over the episcopate, and of the ruling episcopate over clergy and active church members deprived of all rights. The methods of governing the Church adopted by the Moscow Patriarchate are at root contrary to the principles of canon law and, in particular, to the decisions of the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church of 1917–18; they establish a structure that corresponds not to the “holy, catholic and apostolic Church” but, in essence, to a militarised barracks structure built on the unquestioning subordination of junior to senior.
The first point of the model statute of parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church declares: “The parish is a religious association constituting the primary structural subdivision of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Were these principles of a militarised organisation, permeated with iron discipline, not taken from the internal service regulations of state security? Under this statute not even a parish assembly can be convened without the permission of the ruling bishop.
The totalitarian character of the Moscow Patriarchate is reinforced by the transfer of all movable and immovable church property (buildings, sacred objects, plots of land) into the centralised ownership of the Church’s top leadership, which has concentrated property and power in the hands of the patriarch and the Synod. It is precisely this anti-canonical “privatisation” by the church nomenklatura, the removal of their property from the control of the communities, that has created the material foundation for the all-powerful control of the Patriarchate’s leadership over every aspect of church life.
Within the Moscow Patriarchate no dialogue is possible on pressing church and social problems; thinking people who express a point of view that does not coincide with the “general line” of the Synod are immediately driven out of the Church. The present Moscow Patriarchate has not even a hint of the social doctrine whose development it itself proclaimed several years ago. Yet this is one of the defining directions of the Church’s true service to the people!
The prophetic ministry of Christ has also not been received by the Church. The image of prophetic ministry includes not so much the gift of foresight as, first of all, courage in exposing lies and in fighting for the truth. It was for precisely this that Christ was crucified.
The Moscow Patriarchate lives outside the fundamental problems both of the Church itself and of the country and society. For it there are no economic or social problems, no problems of alcoholism, drug addiction, abortion, no national or environmental problems and many others. There are no problems of people thrown “overboard” from life. What common interests can the synodal oligarchs have with aged pensioners whose pensions are below the subsistence level? Where else in the world can one find a sect that treats its followers with such contempt?
The church leadership has long ceased to serve the ordinary Orthodox people. It is separated from them by an insurmountable wall of guards and high stone fences. From the ambo we hear cold words about mercy and compassion, while in life we see the hierarchs’ tables groaning with delicacies, their country houses and residences, private aircraft and a regularly replenished fleet of extremely expensive cars. And all this against the background of the extreme poverty of ordinary people, who, taking the bread they need from their own mouths, bring their last “drachma” to the churches so that the “princes of the Church” may wallow in luxury.
The pagan personality cult of Patriarch Alexy II (zealously inflated by the media) has long since degenerated into the grave sin of idolatry. All this contrary to the decision of the Council of 1917–1918, which recognised the Patriarch only as first among the bishops equal to him.
Can one imagine Christ with the doors closed to his ordinary followers? Can one imagine the apostle Peter guarded by muscular thugs from a state protection service so that, God forbid, some simple soul with a vain request for a piece of bread should not get through to him?
We do not speak here of the flagrant crimes of the Moscow Patriarchate before God and people connected with the moral corruption of its hierarchs, which everyone who reads the newspapers already knows about: the embezzlement of humanitarian aid worth over 2 billion dollars, the tobacco and vodka with which the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate corrupt our citizens and believers, the oil that brings fabulous profits to mitred monks who have supposedly renounced the world and all that is in the world.
The estrangement of the Patriarchate from the people, its unwillingness to speak openly with the faithful and its fear of change force the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church into a direct violation of the requirement of the Statute providing for a Local Council to be held every five years. Not five but ten (now eighteen) years have already passed since the last Council in 1990, at which the present Patriarch Alexy II was elected.
The leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate has committed a most grievous sin against the “Holy of Holies” of Orthodoxy, its Conciliarity, by cancelling the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church planned for the jubilee year of the Millennium of Christianity and replacing it on 11 January with a nomenklatura reception in the State Kremlin Palace with an entertainment programme, which struck many as a most grievous profanation of the greatest of jubilees.